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Legitimacy of the ruling: a formal approach 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The Dutch legal system is part of the legal systems of “civil law” employed 
in Continental Europe, which are all indebted to the French judicial system. 
The Dutch judicial system, therefore, exhibits some of the characteristics of 
the French model. If we confine the comparison to the highest courts in the 
country, as Lasser does in his book Judicial Deliberations,1 the similarities 
revolve around, among other things, the Court’s duties and procedures. 
With regard to the Court’s duty: like the Court de cassation, the Dutch 
Supreme Court judges whether the law has been violated by lower courts 
by determining the proper meaning and mode of application of legal rules. 
In this respect, the Supreme Court acts, as it were, as bouche de la loi, 
mouthpiece of the law, for the Court determines how the law – that is: how 
statutes and treaties – are to be read and applied. This famous quote of 
Montesquieu – the judge as mouthpiece of the law – is, by the way, not to 
be understood as the expression of legalism, that is, the idea of mechanical 
jurisprudence, but refers to the independence of the judge with regard to 
the executive power:2 it says that the judge has to administer justice 
according to law, not according to the will or whims of the king, that is, the 
executive power. 
When an appeal has been lodged with the Dutch Supreme Court, the 
procedure also resembles the Court de cassation. The Court does not decide 
until it has been informed by the Conclusion of the Advocate-General. The 
Conclusion consists of a full analysis of the issue at stake and an 
extensively motivated advice on how to decide the case. In this respect, the 
Dutch judicial argument is, like its French example, characterized by 
bifurcation. 
Despite these similarities, Dutch legal praxis differs significantly from 
the French model. Until a few decades ago, the mode of argumentation of 
the Dutch Supreme Court resembled the Court de cassation, in that the 
reasoning of the Court suggested that the final decision stemmed logically 
from the law. But from the seventies onwards, the Court started to justify 
the chosen solution. Nevertheless, the Court’s reasoning rarely reflects the 
choices and considerations for or against the decision. The reasoning is 
often one-sided, discussing extensively the arguments supporting the 
decision, whereas the counter arguments are only considered to the extent 
that they contribute to the elucidation of the Court’s own choice.3 Only in 
exceptional cases does the Court expatiate upon the pro’s and cons of the 
decision.  These cases occur only occasionally and do not affect the overall 
picture that the judicial argument does not provide full insight into the 
Court’s deliberations.  
Some authors regard this lack of transparency as a deficiency. They 
regard the law as discursive, that is, the law is seen as the always 
provisional outcome of developing opinions and beliefs.4 By not giving full 
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insight into the considerations, at the least in cases that demand a fresh 
judgment, the Dutch Supreme Court, they argue, falls short of the ideals of 
judicial control and accountability, democratic debate and deliberations. In 
my opinion, this critique ignores the bifurcation as it appears in Dutch 
judicial discourse. One of the differences between the French and Dutch 
courts of cassation concerns the role of the Conclusion of the Advocate-
General. Contrary to French legal praxis, the Dutch Supreme Court 
publishes both of its discourses simultaneously in every case. In the 
majority of cases, the Conclusion of the Advocate-General can therefore be 
considered as part of the Court’s judicial argument. In so doing, the scope 
of the Dutch Supreme Court’s judicial argument is extended, now that the 
Court’s concise judicial argument is supplemented or complemented by the 
extensive deliberations of the Advocate-General. In this paper I want to 
investigate to what extent the Conclusion of the Advocate-General 
contributes to the legitimacy of the Supreme Court’s ruling. In so doing I 
hope to contribute to the comparative analysis of judicial transparency and 
legitimacy, a topic that has been thoroughly addressed by Lasser in his 
study “Judicial Deliberations”. 
 
 
2. The laconic style of the Dutch Supreme Court: an example 
 
In order to demonstrate how the Conclusion contributes to the Dutch 
Supreme Court’s judicial argument, I will discus a relatively minor case: 
Transvemij/Graphé.5 The case revolves around the exact meaning of the 
word “finding” ’ in the (legal) provision concerning the legal obligation to 
assign a finder’s reward whenever abandoned property is restituted to the 
owner.  
Here are the facts of the case: A stolen car had been found by a 
company, called Graphé, that professionally tracks down missing cars. As 
such, Graphé claimed a finder’s reward according to section 10, paragraph 
2 of Book 5 Civil Code, which states: “The finder who satisfies his liabilities 
is entitled to an equitable reward”. The insurance company, to which the 
property of the stolen car had been transferred, contested this claim, 
arguing among others that the provision doesn’t apply in this situation. 
According to the insurance company, the word “finder” in the provision has 
to be conceived as “finder by chance”, as the purpose of the provision 
would be to reward only the true finder. Since Graphé was a company that 
professionally traces down missing cars, Graphé could not be qualified as 
“true finder” and shouldn’t therefore be entitled to the finder’s reward. 
The Supreme Court threw the objection out in two steps. The Court 
first declared that, according to legal history, the provision aims to advance 
the recovery of lost property. The Court then states that a broad 
interpretation of the word “finding”, corresponding to the linguistic meaning 
of “finding”, squares with the provisional intention. Therefore, even when 
an object is not found by mere chance, but is traced down, this has to be 
qualified as “finding”, and a company that professionally tracks down lost 
properties, should also be qualified for a finder’s reward. 
Here, the Supreme Court matches the French Court de cassation in 
succinctness. One can hardly speak of an explanation of the Court’s legal 
reasoning. The Court simply states the alleged intent of the provision, 
notwithstanding that it is this intention that had been contested by the 
claimant. From this intent, the Court then infers that the word “finding” 
could well be understood according to common parlance, a reading that is 
the very interpretation the claimant seeks to contest. In its reasoning, the 
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Court doesn’t offer policy arguments of any kind and it makes no effort to 
present countervailing arguments or to address alternative points of view.6 
This is even more remarkable, when we take into consideration that the 
Supreme Court had to determine the range of application of this provision 
for the first time after its enactment.7 Under these circumstances, one 
would have expected a comprehensive line of reasoning in order to foster 
judicial accountability and control, to encourage democratic debate and 
deliberation, and ultimately to establish judicial legitimacy.  
 
 
3. Conclusion and ruling: bifurcation 
 
How, then, should we assess the Court’s argumentation in light of the ideal 
of judicial legitimacy? If we take the Supreme Court’s argumentation in 
isolation, it obviously doesn’t meet the requirement of rationality, that is, 
the demands of transparency of reasons and accountability. But the 
Supreme Court’s ruling doesn’t emerge out of the blue. Its ruling is given 
within a procedural framework, which both confines and widens the scope 
of the very reasons which, explicitly or implicitly, underpin the Court’s 
decision. Firstly, and mentioned above, the Court’s ruling is published 
together with the Conclusion of the Advocate-General, the latter serving as 
a repository of arguments that support or complement the Court’s 
argumentation. Secondly, the Court’s judgment is intimately connected to 
the claimant’s grievances: the Court settles a restricted dispute in appeal, 
but doesn’t examine all legal facets of the case as such. I will return to this 
point later. Finally, the majority of the rulings of the Supreme Court, 
published in Nederlandse Jurisprudentie (NJ), the Dutch version of the West 
Case Reports or Recueil Dalloz, are supplemented by academic notes: a 
short or comprehensive doctrinal comment on the ruling. These notes offer 
an appreciation of the Court’s ruling by the country’s most distinguished 
legal scholars, who not only hold high academic offices, but oftentimes act 
as deputy judge as well. As in France, the notes are part of the institutional 
framework of the Dutch judicial system, adressing the subtleties of the 
ruling and its legal underpinning. In this article, for reasons of space, I will 
nevertheless disregard the rôle of the notes in the Dutch judiciary system. 
 Firstly, I would like to examine to what extent the Conclusion of the 
Advocate-General contributes to the legitimacy of the Court’s ruling of this 
case. After discussing thoroughly the treatment of the case in the previous 
courts and the claimant’s grievances, Advocate-General Hartkamp 
considers, first of all, the grievance that interest us here: that 
professionally tracing down missing cars can never be qualified as  “finding” 
in the context of the provision. This complaint is dismissed by Hartkamp on 
several grounds. He primarily rejects the complaint with an appeal to legal 
history, and combines this argument drawing on the ordinary meaning of 
the word “finding” (linguistic argument) and adding a consequentionalist 
argument. He argues that the original enactment holds a definition of 
“finder” that doesn’t comprise any clues to the intentions of the finder 
whatsoever. This viewpoint squares with the ordinary meaning of the word 
“finding”, which also denotes the act of deliberatively searching for an 
object. This viewpoint also corresponds with legislative intent. The provision 
aims, among others, to promote that the person who lost his property, will 
recover it as much as possible. To withdraw professional findings from the 
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provision would be at variance with the provision’s purpose. Therefore, the 
provision is in need of a range of application as large as possible. 
 Hartkamp also appeals to a systematic argument. Legal history 
reveals that this provision can be conceived of as a particularization of 
caretaking: the finder serves, as it were, as caretaker manager. If the legal 
provision concerning finding wouldn’t have existed, the finder would have 
been entitled for a reward in his quality as caretaker manager. In order to 
be qualified as caretaker manager, the law requires that the caretaker 
manager has acted professionally. Therefore, to exclude the professional 
finder from the provision, as the claimant contended, would be contrary to 
the more generic provision of caretaking. 
 Hartkamp ends his treatment with a linguistic argument. The 
claimant argued that decisive element in the concept of finding is the 
element of chance; therefore, only the true finder, not the professional one, 
can be qualified as finder. The grievance has been rejected by Hartkamp, 
because the professional finder is also subject to chance: even when an 
object is deliberatively looked for, one cannot be certain where it will be 
found. 
 Both Supreme Court and Advocate-General arrive, then, at the same 
conclusion: “finding” in the context of the provision comprises also the act 
of professionally finding; and therefore, Graphé, the company that 
professionally traced down the stolen car, is entitled to the finder’s reward, 
at least in principle. Both decisions are primarily justified by an appeal to 
legislative intent and a linguistic argument: the ordinary meaning of the 
word “finding”. But whereas the Advocate-General took pains to argue for 
the alleged purpose of the provision, the Supreme Court only stated its 
purpose. It is theoretically possible, but not very likely, that the Court 
reached its judgment along different lines of reasoning than the Advocate-
General. By not mentioning the grounds on which the Court determined the 
purpose of the provision, the Court seems to suggest that it agrees with the 
Advocate-General’s explanation, all the more so since both discourses were 
published simultaneously. In this respect, the Conclusion of the Advocate-
General supplements, as it were, the Court’s own judicial reasoning. In so 
doing, the scope of the Court’s own argumentation has expanded, resulting 
in a more transparent reasoning that contributes to ideals such as judicial 
control and accountability. 
 The assumption that the Advocate-General’s reasoning supplements 
the Supreme Court’s reasoning isn’t as bold as one might expect. 
Sometimes, the Court doesn’t justify its decision at all, but simply refers to 
the grounds stated in the Conclusion. In its ruling of January 15th 1999 (NJ 
1999/574) the Court’s ruling consisted of just one sentence, stating: ‘The 
grievance fails on the grounds set out at numbers 8 till 17 of the Conclusion 
of the Public Prosecutor.’ Here, it is plain that both opinion and grounds of 
the Court and Advocate-General concur. But in the vast majority of cases, 
the Court doesn’t refer to the Conclusion at all. With regard to these cases, 
one might object, we can never prove whether or not the Court really 
agrees with the arguments, adduced in the Conclusion. But this objection 
does not seriously affect the thesis. The same holds for the argumentation 
of the Supreme Court itself, a body that consists of several members, but 
that is supposed to speak unanimously. Even when the judges of the Court 
agree upon the final ruling, they might differ in opinion which reasons best 
justify the ruling. They have to deal with these differences and have got to 
arrive at an argumentation that is acceptable for the majority of the judges. 
The judicial reasoning is, therefore, less the expression of the personal 
convictions of the judges, but a reasoning that, according to the judges, 
sufficiently justifies the ruling. It is this compromise that serves as 
justification for the ruling. The same holds for the Conclusion of the 
Advocate-General. It is hardly relevant whether or not the Court would 
have framed a line of reasoning, similar to the Advocate-General’s one. 
What matters is that the argumentation is considered to be sufficient.  
 
 
4. The Court’s argumentation from a procedural point of view 
 
In order to assess the legitimacy of the Supreme Court’s ruling properly, we 
not only have to take into consideration the bifurcation of the Court’s 
judicial discourse, as we just did, but we must also consider what is 
contested, that is, one has to consider the Supreme Court’s ruling in 
connection to the grievances that are raised against the sentence on 
appeal. Legal practice is, to quote Ronald Dworkin, an argumentative 
practice.8 Both the Court’s decision and its justification are intimately 
connected to the argumentation that underpins the claimant’s grievances. 
Seen from this angle, the Court’s ruling in “Transvemij/Graphé” is less 
unsatisfactory then it seems to be at first. For if the point at issue is the 
proper meaning of a word, given the alleged purpose of the provision, the 
Court’s judicial reasoning seems to go without a genuine justification: it 
just states a different provisional purpose, as would be evident from legal 
history, and it sustains this judgment with a single argument: the ordinary 
meaning of the word. But in many cases, the Supreme Court rejects the so 
called linguistic reading of a statute, appealing instead to systematic or 
historical arguments, legal principles or other substantial arguments.9 Why 
does the linguistic argument suffice in this case? 
 The answer is: it suffices given the procedural setting with regard to 
the particular grievances. Starting point of the claimant’s grievance is the 
Court of Appeal’s judgment that “finding” includes “professionally finding”. 
This judgment had been justified drawing on legal history. The Court of 
Appeal thoroughly discussed the reasons why the provision had to be 
understood as a provision that aims to foster the recovery of lost property. 
The claimant objected to this judgment with just a single argument: the 
denotation of the word “finding” excludes “deliberatively searching”. But 
given the ordinary meaning of “finding”, which also comprises the situation 
of “deliberatively searching”, and given the provisional purpose as 
determined by the Court of Appeal, it is not only obvious that the grievance 
had to fail, but also that a plain refutation suffices. As the Conclusion of the 
Advocate-General showed up, the provisional intent could also be justified 
with a systematic and a consequentionalist argument. But the grievance, on 
the one hand, didn’t oblige the Court to pursue its argumentation, while the 
bifurcation of the Supreme Court’s discourse, on the other, justifies the 
Court’s succinct argumentation, being supplemented by the comprehensive 
reasoning of the Advocate-General. 
 
 
5. The Court’s reasoning from a constitutional point of view 
 
All this not only justifies, but also accounts for the succinct style of the 
judicial reasoning of the Dutch Supreme Court in this case. But there might 
be another cause that has influenced the Court’s reasoning. This cause is 
connected with the constitutional position of the judiciary. Although we no 
longer speak of the judge as bouche de la loi, mouthpiece of the law, 
connected as this term is with the obsolete idea of mechanical 
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jurisprudence, it is still part of our political ideals, i.e. the ideal of the 
separation of powers, to demand that the judges have to administer justice 
according to law. The Dutch judicial system may be less rigid then the 
French model, but it deals with the same challenge: to maintain legislative 
supremacy while simultaneously encouraging and yet controlling judicial 
interpretive authority.10 One technique to uphold the judge’s binding to the 
law while interpreting the law, is to settle the dispute according to what 
MacCormick and Summers have labeled ‘legislative intention’, that is, the 
intention, ascribed to the legislator as a supposedly ideally rational agent, 
uttering this statutory text with legislative intent in that historical, legal 
and political setting.11 The more the judge made use of data which are 
independent of personal appreciation, the less the interpretation of a 
statutory text is supposed to be motivated by personal preferences. The 
hierarchy of types of arguments, as proposed by MacCormick and Summers, 
is based on this assumption. The words of a statutory rule belong to the 
alleged ‘objective data’, as well as legislative intent as appears from 
traveaux préparatoires. Politico-moral values and principles of law, on the 
other hand, are supposed to be less objective, for the determination of 
these data demands judgment.  
 Regarded from this perspective, it is understandable that the 
Supreme Court was inclined to confine its reasoning to these two 
arguments: the ordinary meaning of the word ‘finding’ and legislative intent 
as appears from the traveaux préparatoires. The Supreme Court could have 
made use of more substantive arguments, but in so doing the decision 
would have seemed to be less objective. 
 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
The style of the Dutch Supreme Court both resembles and differs from the 
French Court de cassation. It resembles the Court de cassation in style 
(collegial), and in some cases also in tone (magisterial) and form 
(syllogistic). The main difference between both Courts concerns the 
publicity of the Conclusion of the Advocate-General. In the Dutch judicial 
system, the often extensively motivated Conclusion and the Court’s ruling 
are published simultaneously. As the Conclusion advises the Supreme Court 
how to decide the case, both discourses should be read in connection. As 
such, the Conclusion serves as a repository of arguments that supplements 
or complements the Court’s ruling. 
The analysis of the above discussed case also suggests that the concise 
reasoning of the Dutch Supreme Court could be prompted by procedural 
considerations, rather than the urge to uphold the official portrait of 
formalist judicial application of codified law. 
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